UNITED NATIONS

General Assembly

FORTY-SEVENTH SESSION

Official Records

FIRST COMMITTEE
16th meeting
held on
Friday, 23 October 1992
at 10 a.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 16th MEETING

Chairman:	Mr. ELARABY	(Egypt)
later:	Mr. PATOKALLIO (Vice-Chairman)	(Finland)

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92-61580 2308V (E)

Distr. GENERAL
A/C.1/47/PV.16
27 November 1992

ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m.

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GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ITEMS

Mr. DEYANOV (Bulgaria): Today I wish to speak on issues related to non-proliferation and export controls of weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms.

We see the growing interest in curbing the global spread of weapons of mass destruction as a timely response to well-founded concerns about the dangers to peace and stability posed by the potential acquisition of such weapons by more States.

The focus on preventive diplomacy in dealing with regional conflicts in the post-cold-war world and the recent progress in disarmament have additionally highlighted the non-proliferation motivation in the arms control policy of States. Individual and joint non-proliferation initiatives constitute at present one of the principal avenues of maintaining peace, security and stability in the world.

Bulgaria regards the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the best available international instrument to prevent nuclear proliferation. We consider the Treaty to be a major building block of the international arms-control regime.

We welcome the Treaty's ratification by France and China. This act should be seen as an important indication of a growing international effort to ensure the viability of the Treaty at a crucial moment in the history of non-proliferation. Other Member States which are not yet parties to the Treaty should also adhere to it.

In this context, we look forward to the early adherence to the NPT of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus as non-nuclear-weapon States, as well as of the

(Mr. Deyanov, Bulgaria)

other independent Republics of the former Soviet Union. Bulgaria is interested in widening the non-nuclear-weapon environment of such a volatile part of Europe as the Balkans. We are glad to note that steps are being taken in the countries there to reduce the risk of unauthorized diversion and export of nuclear materials, weapons and other internationally controlled items and technologies. Current efforts to strengthen sensitive export controls and to establish international science and technology centres in Moscow and Kiev are important measures to this effect.

Bulgaria believes that the recent positive developments bringing us closer to universal adherence to the NPT should be consolidated by full implementation of all provisions of the Treaty. As the InterAction Council rightly pointed out in its Final Statement, adopted in May this year:

> "in the world of the 21st century, Article VI [of the NPT] may prove as crucial to the future of non-proliferation as Article II has proved in the past." (A/47/437, annex, para. 3)

We believe that this point applies also to efforts to advance the process leading to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

My delegation regards the recent progress in nuclear disarmament as a significant contribution to the Treaty's implementation. Uninterrupted continuation of this process will greatly facilitate its extension beyond 1995 by the States parties to the NPT. Bulgaria favours such an indefinite extension, and will work towards that goal at the NPT conference in 1995.

We believe that starting timely preparation for the 1995 extension conference should be one of the Committee's major tasks at its current session. It is our hope that a draft resolution to this effect will be

(Mr. Deyanov, Bulgaria)

adopted by consensus. This would give full effect to the intent of the parties to the NPT, expressed in General Assembly decision 46/413, to form a preparatory committee open to all parties, which could hold its first meeting in the first half of 1993. My delegation is willing to sponsor such a draft resolution.

Our world urgently needs most effective international action to safeguard nuclear materials and to detect in time and to prevent transfers or clandestine production of nuclear weapons. It is natural to expect that in the new international environment nuclear cooperation should become conditional on adherence to, and strict compliance with, the NPT or other equally binding bilateral or multilateral agreements, as well as on the adoption of full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as a necessary prerequisite for the supply of nuclear materials.

(Mr. Deyanov, Bulgaria)

Bulgaria believes that the idea put forward in the plenary Assembly that the Security Council should become a forum for non-proliferation enforcement deserves serious consideration. The potential spread of weapons of mass destruction has obviously become a greater threat to international peace and security. The assumption of such a function by the Security Council would therefore be fully in line with its basic responsibilities under the United Nations Charter. The Security Council is entitled to and should adopt measures that curb proliferation and even apply sanctions against States that engage in proliferation when they violate international agreements.

The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in this respect has to be further enhanced. We believe that the IAEA must receive all the resources necessary to strengthen its safeguards regime, conduct special inspections, and refer unresolved cases of proliferation to the Security Council, as provided for in the Agency's statute.

The entry into force of the safeguards agreements under the non-proliferation Treaty and the commencement of regular inspection activities by the IAEA in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and in South Africa will contribute to creating confidence in the peaceful character of the nuclear activities of these States. Bilateral agreements - such as the one between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which provides for mutual openness and transparency - serve as another tool for alleviating regional suspicions and creating more trust between States.

I wish to express my delegation's satisfaction with the conclusion by Brazil, Argentina and Chile of a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as well as with the banning of chemical and biological weapons in these countries. We welcome their current actions to bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force for the three States and to widen the area of application of the

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nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America. France has also made an important contribution to this end by recently ratifying the Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We hope that, following these events, that Treaty, as amended, will soon enter fully into force. My delegation is therefore prepared to support a draft resolution welcoming these positive developments.

For a number of years Bulgaria has been suggesting at this and other disarmament forums that nuclear-weapon States should act decisively to enhance the viability of the non-proliferation Treaty regime by extending credible and legally binding security assurances also to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to that Treaty. The Bulgarian delegation is therefore pleased to note the United States proposal made in the plenary Assembly that the Security Council should reassure the States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty that it will seek immediate action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State that is the victim of an act of aggression or the object of a threat of aggression involving nuclear weapons.

We believe that the recent adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to the non-proliferation Treaty has created a favourable political environment not only for asserting non-proliferation objectives, but also for reaching an agreement on appropriate security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Now, when the military confrontation between former alliances in Europe no longer exists, there should be no reason why such assurances cannot be provided without adversely affecting the basic security interests of nuclear-weapon States.

I should like to turn now to issues related to export controls for non-proliferation purposes. Export controls of sensitive items for non-proliferation purposes have become high on the international arms-control

(Mr. Deyanov, Bulgaria)

agenda. Bulgaria supports the current efforts to widen and enhance international cooperation in implementing the respective guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. We also believe that ways and means should be explored to strengthen linkages between these suppliers clubs and the respective specialized agencies of the United Nations system.

In line with its non-proliferation policy, my country is doing its best to adapt national export-control structures to strengthened international requirements. Bulgaria is member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and participates in the current process of enhancing its export guidelines and other relevant instruments. To this end, the Bulgarian Government has adopted a decision fully to implement the new export-control arrangements agreed upon by the Nuclear Suppliers Group in Warsaw this year. They are now part of the nuclear export policy of my Government. We have also adopted the export procedures put into effect by the Zangger Committee. The Government of Bulgaria has officially applied to become a member of that Committee.

Final preparations are being made in my country to establish a comprehensive national system of export controls covering all sensitive areas, including nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile-related items and technologies. The intention of the Bulgarian Government is to build up export controls that are in line with the existing international standards. To accomplish this objective, my country relies on the assistance of States that have made considerable progress in enforcing their respective export controls.

Forming part of the dual-use export control regulations to be introduced soon in Bulgaria are the guidelines applied by the Missile Technology Control Regime partners and the export procedures of the Australia Group covering all the 50 identified chemical-weapon precursors, dual-use equipment and

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biological agents. The Government of Bulgaria intends to continue to follow these arrangements strictly and to apply for possible full membership in these forums. This would permit us to follow closely future changes in internationally agreed dual-use regimes and adjust the national export-control regulations accordingly.

Bulgaria wishes to maintain regular contacts and carry out consultations with like-minded countries that have similar understandings as to internationally agreed standards, guidelines and norms of export controls of dual-use materials, equipment and technology for non-proliferation purposes. Our understanding is that the underlying purpose of this cooperation and harmonization of approaches to export controls is not to restrict international trade relations but, rather, to serve as an important prerequisite for widening trade relations in sensitive areas under effective non-proliferation commitments. Bulgaria is very interested in the benefits of such cooperation in new, free-market-economy conditions. We expect that my country could thus acquire unrestricted access to modern technologies.

It is our belief that the United Nations and other international forums should have an important share in elaborating a universal mechanism of export controls on weapon-related high technologies. The objective should be to establish a climate of global restraint compatible with the increased need for economic development in a world of dramatic changes and instability. For many countries, including Bulgaria, a major objective will be to ensure unimpeded access to the benefits of science and modern technology under strict, internationally agreed provisions for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile-delivery systems.

(Mr. Deyanov, Bulgaria)

In my previous statement in the Committee, I outlined the general approach of the delegation of Bulgaria to the effective functioning of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Today I should like to raise a couple of brief points related to the export-control aspects of this issue.

(Mr. Dayanov, Bulgaria)

My country subscribes to the call in General Assembly resolution 46/36 L for all Member States to exercise restraint in exports and imports of conventional arms, particularly in situations of tension or conflict. We also welcome the point made in the same resolution that to ensure this Member States should have in place an adequate body of laws and administrative procedures with regard to the transfer of arms and should adopt strict measures for their enforcement.

My delegation hopes that that appeal of the General Assembly, and all the other provisions of resolution 46/36 L, will have a universally positive response, particularly with respect to arms transfers, which may have a destabilizing effect. The Bulgarian Government supports efforts aimed at the adoption of concerted international measures to ensure the attainment of that important goal. In this respect, we wish to note the progress achieved by the five permament members of the Security Council, which also happen to be the biggest arms suppliers.

The Government of Bulgaria has already introduced a set of interim regulations related to the control of the manufacturing, export and import of conventional arms, military equipment and other military-related products. The scope and mechanism of those regulations correspond to the established control systems of countries that are trying to enforce the most advanced export controls on their arms trade.

A special governmental commission has been set up in Bulgaria to monitor and ensure effective enforcement of the established export-control régime. This commission is the only licensing authority in the country entitled to issue general trading licences to interested companies and licences for specific transactions in this field. Strict control is being exercised to prevent unauthorized arms transfers. In full compliance with the respective

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Security Council resolutions, the Government of Bulgaria has taken all the necessary administrative steps to enforce the international embargo on arms transfers, particularly to Iraq, Yugoslavia, Somalia and Libya.

In conclusion, I wish to emphasize the willingness of the delegation of Bulgaria to consider and possibly sponsor all draft resolutions providing for strengthened non-proliferation and export-control régimes.

Mr. HASSAN (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): Allow me at the outset to condole, through you, Mr. Chairman, with the fraternal people of Egypt over the tragedy of the recent earthquake. I pray God that they may be spared from harm in future.

I should also like to extend to you my delegation's congratulations on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee in which the international community places such great hopes. We wish you and the other officers of the Committee every success in carrying out the tasks with which you have been entrusted. We also pledge the cooperation of the delegation of Iraq in facilitating the Committee's work and enabling us to adopt the appropriate decisions.

Our international community stands today at a decisive crossroads. When the bipolar international order based on the arms race, the cold war, nuclear terror and wars waged by proxy collapsed, its demise gave rise to hopes that a new world free of wars and acute ideological conflicts might emerge and that the efforts of the international community might turn from the arms race to questions of development and the preservation of the environment. Unfortunately, however, those hopes have not materialized. Indeed, racial and sectarian wars and conflicts have become more acute, as have border clashes in different parts of the world. New trends have emerged towards the fragmentation of States into smaller entities along ethnic or geographical

(Mr. Hassan, Iraq)

lines. All this has had extremely grave consequences for international security as a whole. Under these circumstances, there has been an increased tendency towards greater armament together with a rise to record levels of the armaments budgets of States. This has had very deleterious effects, not only on international security but also on the world's economic situation with the result that economic crises have become more and more acute, particularly in the case of the developing countries which suffer from a scarcity of resources.

This picture is not intended to detract from the importance of the achievements that have been made in the field of disarmament and arms limitation. However, the facts on the ground indicate that over-optimism and self-congratulation on partial achievements do not serve the cause of peace and security for all mankind. If we compare what has been achieved and what should be achieved, we shall find that we still have a very long way to go and that every State must view disarmament questions not from the standpoint of its own unrealistic security ambitions which have been proved to be futile by history, but rather with the aim of creating the best possible conditions for the establishment of a system of collective security within the framework of a world order in which the United Nations, through the collective will of its Members, should play the decisive role in creating for mankind a world that would be free from the spectre of destruction, a world of justice, equality and single standards.

If we go back and search for the beginning of the international community's endeavours in the areas of arms limitation and disarmament, we shall find that the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament of 1978 will stand as the definitive enunciation of disarmament priorities and orientations. Where do we stand today in the light of that Document?

(Mr. Hassan, Iraq)

Unfortunately, there has not been any substantial progress in the area of nuclear disarmament, which was given absolute priority in the 1978 Final Document because nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the very survival of civilization. The nuclear States have been satisfied with bilateral negotiations that aim at reducing specific types of nuclear weapons. Certain nuclear-weapon States have refused to give the Conference on Disarmament - the sole multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament - the mandate it needs to make headway in such areas as halting the nuclear-arms race, prohibiting nuclear testing and achieving nuclear disarmament.

The same is true of the obligations of nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), particularly the obligation set out in article VI of the Treaty to negotiate towards the adoption of effective measures to halt the nuclear-arms race in the near future, to achieve nuclear disarmament and to agree on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. No substantial progress has been made in that direction over the past 25 years. This is a fact that will oversahadow the 1995 NPT Review Conference, unless the nuclear States promptly adopt measures before that Conference, particularly with respect to a complete nuclear-test ban and the necessary guarantees for non-nuclear States.

As for chemical disarmament, we must state that while we believe in the importance of the draft Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and in its lofty objectives, we consider that it will fall short of guaranteeing security, particularly in areas of tension, unless it is accompanied by a total ban on all other weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Hassan, Iraq)

If developing countries have commented on some of the draft Convention's measures, it was to voice their fear that double standards will be at play in the application of such measures. We in the Arab region have additional reasons for such fear because of Israel's possession of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. This poses a grave threat to Arab national security and to the safety of the States of the region. Israel's possession of nuclear weapons will continue to pose a threat to regional security in our area unless the problem is finally solved by a ban on weapons of mass destruction.

In this respect, I must refer to the fact that my country was among the first to call for a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East through accession by all the States of the region to international treaties banning such weapons as a first fundamental step towards the establishment of the zone.

With respect to conventional weapons, despite all the protestations of good intentions regarding the curbing of the conventional-arms trade, and despite United Nations resolutions on this subject, States that produce advanced weaponry of this kind persist in their feverish rush to sell them, principally in the worst areas of tension in the world. This takes place on such a scale that an unbiased observer cannot help questioning the veracity of those protestations of good intentions and the earnest implementation of those resolutions.

Some speakers in this Committee have called upon Iraq to implement the provisions of Security Council resolutions on weapons. We know that some delegations did this in good faith, on the force of information available to them, information that continues to be touted by the media. Let me set the record straight on this subject by very briefly reviewing the aspects of our

(Mr. Hassan, Iraq)

implementation of the requirements set out in section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

As members know, my country has been the victim of a total military attack under the cover of implementing Security Council resolution 678 (1990). The bombs that were rained on my country equalled seven Hiroshima-type nuclear bombs. Destruction was total. Not even economic institutions or purely civilian shelters were spared.

Then came Security Council resolution 687 (1991) which Iraq accepted and cooperated fully in implementing its provisions with the Special Commission and with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in a professional and thoroughly honest manner. Today, a year and a half after that cooperation began, I should like to review its aspects.

In the nuclear sphere, 14 inspection teams have visited Iraq and have implemented the requirements of the first and second phases of the process defined in the resolution, and even began the third phase dealing with forward-looking monitoring. On 2 September 1992, the leader of the fourteenth inspection team, Professor Zifferero, stated very clearly what had been achieved in terms of the provisions of Security Council resolution 687 (1991): he stated unambiguously that the Iraqi nuclear programme had been reduced to "zero".

(Mr. Hassan, Iraq)

As for the non-stop exaggerations and the great to-do about Iraq's nuclear programme, I do not think that anyone needs me to point out to him the evil political intentions behind such clamouring, for Iraq has never tried to possess nuclear weapons and its programme was aimed at obtaining the know-how and nuclear technology that would have enabled it to make a peaceful investment in power plants for the future. The reason for not declaring some of the stages of such a programme was our desire to protect it from aggression similar to Israel's destruction in 1981 of the Tammuz reactor even though it had been placed under the safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency. No one had even given Iraq any guarantee that such an aggression would not be repeated.

In the chemical field, nine inspection teams and three destruction teams have visited Iraq. Those teams have completed the work of the first and second stages in keeping with the requirements of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), and have started the destruction of chemical weapons in cooperation with the Iraqi side. The Special Commission declared that the destruction of those weapons would take six months to one year. This goes to show the extent of the effort exerted by the Iraqi technicians in constructing the facilities required for the destruction of the chemical weapons and their readiness to carry out that destruction in record time compared with the 10- to 15-year period envisaged in the Draft Convention on chemical weapons.

In the field of biological weapons one inspection team and three biological-chemical teams have visited Iraq. The heads of those teams have declared that they found no evidence of Iraq's production of biological weapons.

(Mr. Hassan, Iraq)

In the field of ballistic missiles, 12 teams have visited Iraq and have supervised the destruction of those missiles as required by resolution 687 (1991). Despite the surprise inspection visits by those teams to various sites in Iraq, they have not found any material banned by resolution 687 (1991). There is at present a large inspection team visiting Iraq with experts in various specializations, including a large number of experts in the field of missiles. The Iraqi side is fully cooperating with that team so as to enable it to achieve its task and to affirm that the requirements of resolution 687 have been met.

In addition to these inspection activities, there are teams using helicopters to conduct regular aerial surveys covering all areas of Iraq, as well as American U2 planes which survey the entire Iraqi territory under the umbrella of the Special Commission once every three days. Other intelligence sources of various States, including satellites supply information to the Special Commission in order for the Commission to complete its tasks.

The exaggerations, lies and fabrications concerning Iraq's armaments programmes have become fully exposed as a bare faced political ploy aimed at achieving special goals, including the perpetuation of the economic embargo against the Iraqi people. It is indeed regrettable that some States should deal with the resolutions of the Security Council in such a blatantly double-standard selective manner, and remain silent, for instance, concerning Security Council resolution 487 (1981) which asks Israel to place all its nuclear facilities under international safeguards. Certain States also misinterpret and arbitrarily implement resolution 687 (1991) on weapons limitation in Iraq. Those States arbitrarily misinterpret some paragraphs and disregard others, such as paragraph 14 which calls for the establishment in

(Mr. Hassan, Iraq)

the Middle East of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and the preambular paragraph affirming commitment to Iraq's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.

All the States of the world, large or small, are called upon to tell the truth and to give sound advice to those whom the arrogance of power misleads, in order to show them the right path. As a case in point, let us consider disarmament measures. If such measures are not in keeping with the principles of justice, if they are not applied consistently with a single standard so as to guarantee security for one and all, they will never lead to the desired results. We do not believe that there is any time left for any more failed experiments in such a dangerous field.

Some have done great harm to my country under the pretext of safeguarding the stability of the region. They know full well that it is they who have put an end to stability in the region completely by inviting foreign forces into the region and by signing treaties of alliance, with all the tragic consequences and nefarious effects on the region that we have seen. History will have its say; many truths that they try to drown with their clamour will become apparent. Truth will out.

Mr. ALLAREY (Philippines): Sir, please accept the Philippine delegation's sincerest congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of this important Committee. We know you not only as a distinguished diplomat but also as a renowned scholar of international law. We know that you will steer the deliberations of this Committee with finesse and consummate skill as we tackle the complex issues of our diverse agenda.

We also greet the two Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur, who share the task of ensuring progress in our work; and to the officers of the Committee as a whole we wish to extend our assurances of support and cooperation.

In this post-confrontational era, new and unprecedented developments in international relations continue to unfold - developments that have vastly improved the prospects for resolving outstanding issues and addressing emerging concerns.

The crumbling of ideological barriers and the ensuing realignments have released many States from the embrace of bloc politics and military rivalries. As the two great Powers now embark upon the delicate tasks of dismantling and reducing their most destabilizing arsenals, the spectre of global cataclysm has been greatly diminished. It is heartening to see that democracy, the shift to a free-market economy, and the institution of the rule of law are now on the agenda of nations once seemingly polarized under the regime of East-West confrontation. There remains, however, a discomfiting concern that the incipient new international order could still suffer a set-back in view of what we see as a persistent acquisition of armaments on the part of some States.

Arms proliferation, particularly as regards weapons of mass destruction, undeniably persists as the single greatest threat to international peace and security. This issue must be addressed decisively by the Committee.

(Mr. Allarey, Philippines)

Since the birth of the United Nations and the adoption of the first resolution by the General Assembly, the Philippines has always advocated the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. We are therefore gratified that, for the first time since its entry into force, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) now includes all the acknowledged nuclear- weapon States and the permanent members of the Security Council. Now that the Treaty is nearing universal adherence, it is our hope that it will live up to its widely-recognized role as the centrepiece of the non-proliferation regime.

The Philippines attaches considerable importance to the fate of the NPT. Now that we have decided to convene, in accordance with the provisions of articles VIII and X of the Treaty, a preparatory committee for the 1995 Conference, my delegation is of the view that the 1995 meeting of States parties should be a single conference with a mandate to review its operation and to decide on its extension. We are prepared to support all measures that will strengthen the non-proliferation regime and encourage the participation of observer States in the process, and we will cooperate with other parties to ensure its extension for the longest term possible.

On the issue of nuclear testing, the Philippines believes, as before, that a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be the most effective way of pursuing the process of nuclear disarmament. We look forward therefore to the re-establishment, within the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and hope that it will be given the appropriate negotiating mandate next year.

(Mr. Allarey, Philippines)

A number of recent developments in the field of nuclear testing could advance our common goal of securing a multilateral commitment to ban nuclear tests for all time in all environments. The unilateral moratoriums observed by Russia and France this year, and recently by the United States, provide us with the necessary momentum to conclude a more permanent one. In this context, we welcome the consultations being conducted by the President of the Amendment Conference of the threshold test-ban Treaty, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas of Indonesia. We fully support his call for a special meeting of States parties some time in 1993 to take stock of developments on this issue with a view to determining the viability of resuming the work of the Amendment Conference thereafter.

The Philippines is likewise encouraged by the conclusion of the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. This Convention is the first real multilateral disarmament agreement on an entire class of weapons of mass-destruction. As a State party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Philippines has disavowed the use of chemical and other related weapons. Only last year, in this very Committee, we gave our unequivocal assurance of our intention not to manufacture or store such weapons.

The Philippines, like many States that do not develop or produce chemical weapons, is not fully satisfied however with some provisions of the Convention. Nevertheless, we believe that the Convention should be accepted as a package. In our view, it reflects a carefully crafted balance between security limitations imposed by the weapons-verification measures and the

(Mr. Allarey, Philippines)

imperatives of the economic and technological development of States. Therefore we joined in sponsoring the draft resolution, adopting the text along with more than 130 other States. And I hereby declare the intention of my Government to sign the Treaty in Paris early in 1993.

The end of the cold war has also provided splendid opportunities to address emerging issues the resolution of which could be greatly facilitated by the disarmament agenda. We refer to measures that promote openness and transparency on military matters, such as the United Nations standardized reporting system on military expenditures, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, and the guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters.

Openness and transparency are essential conditions for harmonious international relations. The Philippines has consistently supported the introduction of these measures in its firm belief that these are appropriate first steps in confidence-building. Thus, in accordance with the provisions of resolutions 46/36 H and 46/36 L, we have submitted the necessary information on our policies, guidelines and procedures with regard to the importation and exportation of defence items, as well as of commercial firearms.

As for the recent adoption by consensus of the report of the Panel of Governmental Technical Experts established under resolution 46/36 L, we welcome the recommendations for the effective operation of the Register of Conventional Arms and look forward to its successful implementation and early expansion.

(Mr. Allarey, Philippines)

We cannot help but wonder, however, about the wisdom of allowing the continuing transfer of sophisticated armaments by supplier countries. Such transfers, for whatever reasons, merely create new military centres that may aggravate conflicts already looming in many of our regions. We believe that comprehensive and coordinated changes in the policies and conduct of supplier and receiver countries are needed, taking into account the reasonable defence needs of the latter and the capacity and responsibility of the former to phase in economic conversion plans.

Another issue that bears watching is the matter of science and technology in the field of international security. Even as science and technology spurred the arms race, so can they now be applied to enforce disarmament agreements in such areas as weapons disposal, verification and economic conversion.

Outside the framework of multilateral agreements are parallel multinational efforts to control the transfer of so-called dual-use items. While these efforts help the cause of non-proliferation, there is a pressing need for greater multilateralism to resolve questions of access to dual-use technology and materials for legitimate development purposes.

Like most developing countries, the Philippines believes that development cooperation should be more concretely integrated into the disarmament agenda. In this way, the legitimate needs of developing countries would be addressed in tandem with verification or other control measures that are being contemplated. The non-proliferation of weapons and the development aspirations of the impoverished South are, after all, common global concerns which should be accorded equal treatment by the international community.*

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* Mr. Patokallio (Finland), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

(Mr. Allarey, Philippines)

During the general debate in the plenary Assembly, the Philippine Foreign Secretary, Mr. Roberto R. Romulo, alluded to major advances in some of the world's hitherto intractable conflicts: Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Middle East, Central America, South Africa. Nevertheless, he said, intra-regional and intra-national conflicts continue to ravage people's lives and homes (A/47/PV.26, p.35).

We must address this issue, or the emergence of unwelcome threats, both old and new, might negate the advances we have made. For example, the restructuring efforts in the East and the phasing down of military activities in the West have ironically stimulated a more vigorous North-South weapons trade. Moreover, the widening and deepening gap between the North and South and its attendant ramifications - such as environmental degradation, abject poverty and the mass migration of people - have produced new threats to peace and security for individual States and regions.

In our region of South-East Asia, the post-cold-war era has impelled us to undertake dialogues on security cooperation. Pursuing confidence-building measures to accelerate this process is not really very difficult considering that the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been employing these measures, in all their aspects, since 1967. We already have the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia, which we hope will gain added impetus from the adoption by consensus of a draft resolution during this session. Just recently, ASEAN's role in initiating efforts to find a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian conflict led to the peace-process now in progress there.

More recently the ASEAN Heads of State, during their fourth summit meeting in Singapore, formalized in a declaration the need for continuing

(Mr. Allarey, Philippines)

intra-ASEAN dialogue on security cooperation, as well as promoting external dialogue through the post-ministerial conferences. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meeting held in Manila last July and the senior officials' meeting before that, further dwelt on issues relating to the security situation in the region - an indication of the momentum set by and the extent of the dialogue. One outcome of this process was the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, which calls on all claimants in the area to settle their disputes peacefully and embark on cooperative endeavours.

We are greatly encouraged by statements of support for this dialogue process earlier advanced in the Committee by a number of ASEAN's dialogue partners. The Philippines has always maintained the view that regional States have to develop their own ideas about security, lest the post-cold-war order in the region turn out to be a de facto arrangement, which is not exactly a satisfactory condition for regional stability and development.

Fourteen years ago the Philippines had the privilege of chairing a group of experts to study the relationship between disarmament and international security, established under General Assembly resolution 33/91 I of 16 December 1978, which emphasized that

> "...the relationship between disarmament and international security lies at the very root of the problem of how to find ways by which States can achieve security without engaging in an arms race...". (A/36/597, p.4)

Given the historical context in which that study was completed and the preponderance of split-level thinking at that time, its conclusions were inadvertently forgotten in later efforts to rationalize the work of this Committee. We are therefore gratified to note the Committee's decision to combine the items on disarmament and international security.

(Mr. Allarey, Philippines)

Before concluding may I share an observation concerning the report of the Secretary-General issued pursuant to the Summit Meeting of the Security Council in January 1992. The report contains positive and far-reaching proposals on preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building. The role of these activities, both existing and prospective, in the larger framework of international security deserves everyone's full attention.

But lest we stray from the original intent of the founders of the United Nations, let us be very clear that disarmament must occupy an important niche in the international community's quest for an agenda for peace. Arms proliferation, after all, has been a major determinant in the worsening of conflict situations. We therefore echo the view earlier expressed by some members of the Committee that the time is now ripe for an action-oriented "Agenda for Peace, part II".

Mr. GRIMA (Malta): Allow me at the outset to extend to Mr. Elaraby of Egypt the sincere congratulations of my delegation on his election to the chairmanship of this very important Committee. I am sure that his wisdom and experience will guide the Committee to the successful conclusion of its work. I also wish to take this opportunity to extend my congratulations to the other members of the Bureau on their election.

On 17 June this year the latest in the welcome series of releases of hostages held in Lebanon took place. After years in captivity Messrs. Struebig and Kemptner emerged from the darkness of their cells free men. Similarly, last year 15 new independent States emerged from the darkness of totalitarianism determined to embark on the long and difficult road to

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democracy by refusing to remain hostage to bankrupt authoritarian ideology. Indeed the world is changing at such a pace that not even the historians can keep up.

In just over 36 months we have witnessed dramatic and in most cases unprecedented changes in the international political landscape. What has commonly come to be known as the ending of the cold war is without doubt the most far-reaching of these changes. The Persian Gulf War and its aftermath, the Middle East peace process begun in Madrid, and the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime are also dynamics helping to shape the still-evolving new world order.

Disarmament has been equal to, and at times may even have exceeded, the expectations of change. The unilateral decisions taken by the United States and the Russian Federation have given new direction and impetus to disarmament in general and nuclear disarmament in particular.

My delegation welcomes the complete withdrawal by the United States of ground-launched and naval tactical nuclear weapons and the commitments made by the Presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus, to honour commitments made previously by the former Soviet Union. We also welcome response by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that it would effect a considerable reduction in its nuclear arsenal and the recent ratification by the United States Senate of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty). We also urge those nuclear Powers with moratoriums on nuclear testing currently in place to extend the moratoriums

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further at the end of the designated periods. The time may now be ripe for a concerted effort to be made in the Conference on Disarmament to convert the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The international community has for far too many years subjugated the interests of non-proliferation to those of its own political and strategic considerations. It is for this reason that my delegation is pleased to note that the non-proliferation Treaty is gathering strength as we start preparations for the non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference of 1995.

The non-proliferation Treaty has been strengthened by a significant number of new parties. The decision by France, followed by that of the People's Republic of China, to accede to the Treaty are of particular significance in that both countries are declared nuclear States which had previously refrained from acceding to the Treaty; their decisions mean that all the declared nuclear States are now parties to the Treaty. Moreover, in the past 12 months we have seen the accession of Slovenia, Estonia and Latvia, bringing the total number of signatories to 151.

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My delegation believes that an indefinite extension, in 1995, of the non-proliferation Treaty in its present form would help to reinforce the already widely accepted norm of non-proliferation. Furthermore, we urge those States that are not yet parties to the Treaty to join by 1995. We firmly believe that universality of the Treaty and full compliance with its provisions would consolidate the non-proliferation norm. Ukraine is unlikely to remain alone in the belief that, as its representative asserted in his address to the First Committee on 14 October last year:

> "A situation is developing in which any State's intention not to adhere to the Treaty may be regarded as contrary to the common interests of mankind." (A/C.1/46/PV.3, p.81)

Article III of the non-proliferation Treaty stipulates that all non-nuclear-weapon States must sign agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) submitting their nuclear activities to full-scope safeguards.

Recent instances of disregard for these Treaty obligations have prompted calls for the safeguards system to be strengthened. Subsequent Security Council resolutions have demonstrated the commitment of the international community to upholding these safeguards and the wider non-proliferation norm. In his annual report to the General Assembly last year Mr. Hans Blix, the Director General of the IAEA, called for significant strengthening of IAEA safeguards. Among his recommendations, which we welcome, Mr. Blix suggested that when right of access is not respected - implying that the country in question has something to hide - back-up should be provided by what has been described as "the ultimate arbiter of NPT disputes", the Security Council.

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In this connection, my delegation has listened carefully to the idea, put forward during this General Assembly session, that the Security Council become a key forum for non-proliferation enforcement. We believe that this idea is worthy of further consideration, especially when understood to include those States that, while Members of the United Nations, are not parties to the NPT and are violating the international norms of non-proliferation in such a way as to pose a threat to international peace and security. Indeed, as has already been stated to this Committee, Arms control and disarmament is everybody's business. If we quietly ignore those States that are refusing to acknowledge widely accepted non-proliferation norms, nuclear-weapon instability will again rear its ugly head.

In the same way as the First Committee had as its centre-piece last year the setting up of the arms-transfers Register, there can be little doubt that this year's highlight will be the Committee's endorsement of the draft Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. At the outset, my delegation would like to express its appreciation to Senator Gareth Evans, Foreign Minister of Australia, for his invaluable contribution to the negotiation process and to Ambassador Adolf Ritter von Wagner, whose dedication, determination and leadership helped to guide the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to a successful conclusion.

After 20 years of negotiations, we have before us today a draft Convention that obliges States parties to destroy within 10 years all chemical weapons, including those that have been abandoned, and all chemical-weapon-production facilities.

(Mr. Grima, Malta)

During the plenary meetings of the 1992 session of the Conference on Disarmament Malta declared its unequivocal commitment to the achievement of a total ban on chemical weapons. It stressed its complete opposition to all types of chemical weapons - and to the manufacture, stockpiling and use of all such weapons.

Malta will be among the original signatories to the Convention on chemical weapons as we strongly believe that this Convention enhances not only our national and regional security but international security as a whole.

My delegation sincerely hopes that all countries, particularly those in the Mediterranean region, will become States Parties to the Convention. Indeed, we urge them to do so. We attach great importance to the principle of universality with regard to this Convention - as, indeed, we do in the case of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

We look forward to the Convention's early entry into force and to the implementation of its provisions - in particular, Article XI on economic and technological development. All countries that are States parties to the Convention - even those, such as Malta, with a low chemical-industry capacity - stand to benefit from the provisions of this Article, which is designed to promote expanded international trade, technological development and economic cooperation in the chemical sector.

We welcome the agreement been reached on Article IX of the Convention, which provides for short-notice challenge inspections in cases of suspected non-compliance. We see this as a strong deterrent, as well as a significant confidence-building measure. We believe that, by establishing both this verification regime and an organization in The Hague, the Convention is breaking new ground in the field of multilateral-disarmament agreements.

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Through its inspectorate, the Technical Secretariat will monitor compliance by carrying out the so-called challenge inspections, and, in the event of non-compliance, it will be able, under Article XII, to refer back to the Security Council for further action under the Charter.

In this connection, my delegation hopes that the biological-weapon Convention Verification Expert Group, when it meets next month - its second meeting - will itself break new ground in its efforts to establish a verification regime.

These are some of the reasons for Malta's being among the first countries to sponsor the draft resolution on the Convention on chemical weapons. Submitted under agenda item 60, this draft resolution has received overwhelming support, underlining the growing international commitment to the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.

In recent months there has been increasing awareness that regional arrangements and multilateral action have complementary roles to play in the maintenance of international peace and security. Indeed, in his annual report on the work of the organisation, the Secretary-General states:

> "in the post cold-war period, regional organisations can play a crucial role, if their activities are undertaken in a manner consistent with the principles of Chapter VIII." (A/47/1, para. 114)

It was therefore with a sense of satisfaction that we witnessed, at the Helsinki Summit in July, the endorsement by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) of Malta's proposal that the CSCE be designated as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.

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We believe that this will help the CSCE, through cooperation with the United Nations, to become more action-oriented in the prevention of regional conflicts.

My delegation also welcomes the decision, taken in Helsinki, to establish a CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, which will, inter alia, participate in negotiations on issues of conventional disarmament, arms control and confidence- and security-building measures, undertake consultation on non-proliferation and enhance conflict prevention - all reinforcing the CSCE principle that security is indivisible.

While strongly advocating the peaceful settlement of disputes, we believe that the decision to establish a CSCE peace-keeping system based on United Nations peace-keeping principles is of great significance. Nevertheless, we see the CSCE's peace-keeping role as complementing, and not competing with, the efforts of the United Nations.

My delegation also applauds the Vienna 1992 document on confidence- and security-building measures, which builds on the earlier document. It obliges States, inter alia, to provide all other CSCE States with data on weapon and equipment systems by the end of 1992, and it encourages States to host visits for the purpose of dispelling military concerns.

We also welcome the signing of the open skies Treaty. We see this as a very positive confidence- and security-building measure, and we urge its early entry into force.

Our commitment to the CSCE process is a demonstration of our commitment to European security and cooperation - a commitment that we aspire to strengthening and consolidating in the years to come through full membership of the European Community.

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Our commitment to Europe does not, however, lessen our commitment to the Mediterranean and to Mediterranean policies. As stated in the CSCE Helsinki Final Act, close links exist between security and cooperation in Europe and security and cooperation in the Mediterranean. Situated in the centre of the Mediterranean, surrounded by social, cultural and economic diversity, Malta has through the years taken full advantage of its strategic location in the promotion of security and economic and cultural cooperation in the region. In this spirit, and in recognition of a common Mediterranean heritage with which all peoples of that region can readily identify, my Government joined France, Italy, Portugal and Spain in launching the process of consultations with our North African neighbours known as the five-plus-five Mediterranean forum. Indeed, it was this same motivation that led us to support the Spanish and Italian proposal for a conference on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean - a "CSCM".

There is an increasing awareness that regional security is primarily the responsibility of the States in the region, and its outside imposition is increasingly seen as short-term and short-lived. We believe that this awareness is present in the Middle East peace negotiations, and we hope it will develop into a comprehensive peace based on Security Council resolutions 242 (2967) and 338 (1973). We would like to believe that this awareness is also present in the Cyprus talks being held under the aegis of the Secretary-General. We hope that any progress made this summer will be built upon when the talks reconvene this coming Monday.

We also welcome other regional developments such as the ratification by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of the safeguards

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agreement with the IAEA and the subsequent nuclear inspections. We also welcome the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on 31 December 1991 and the bilateral nuclear inspections for which it provides.

We welcome the safeguards agreement reached between Argentina, Brazil and the IAEA and the amendments approved by the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons from Latin America which will allow Argentine, Brazil and Chile to become parties to the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco. A nuclear-weapon-free Latin America and Caribbean is now practically a reality.

We also very much welcome the setting up of the Arms Transfer Register, and we commend the work carried out throughout this year by the Panel of Governmental Technical Experts on the Register of Conventional Weapons, in particular its Chairman, Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands. We urge all States to provide by 30 April next year relevant and full data on imports into and exports from their territory in the previous calendar year, and we call upon States to recommend a widening of the register when their views on its operation are submitted to the Secretary-General by the end of April 1994.

In conclusion I wish to say a few words about the work of this Committee. In his opening statement to the Committee, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, emphasized that

> "now more than ever we need to approach our work with a high dose of realism and to make action-oriented recommendations". (A/C.1/47/PV.3, p. 12)

We could not agree more. We believe that this Committee should continue where it left off last year. While guarding against the danger of diluting into insignificance principles important to this Committee, we should take our

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deliberations to higher levels by moving from a consensus of tolerance of each others' positions to a consensus of acceptance of each others' positions. Some resolutions could perhaps be taken up less frequently, while others, having been injected with a high dose of realism, could be merged into more meaningful and action-oriented resolutions.

We believe that the First Committee has it within itself to be a guiding light to other Committees in this respect. Our common motivation can and should be driven by a desire to rationalize and make more effective the work of this Committee through a determination to make our resolutions more meaningful and a sense of duty in not allowing, and again I quote Mr. Petrovsky, "the momentum generated in the field of disarmament to dissipate".

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to request the representatives to conduct their consultations with a little more circumspection and a little less noise. I understand the need for consultations, even in this chamber, but we must also respect the right of speakers to be properly heard.

Mr. MATSEIKO (Ukraine): In its first statement before this Committee, the Ukrainian delegation has already expressed its position on principal aspects of disarmament and international security. Now we have in mind to deal basically with item 57, "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

Ukraine is now in the active process of the realization of three non-nuclear principles: not to accept, not to produce and not to acquire nuclear weapons. It is encouraging that this process is being promoted by the

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very positive efforts of some nuclear Powers to lower their respective levels of nuclear capability, such as the recent initiatives on nuclear-weapon tests set forward by France, the United States and the Russian Federation.

Welcoming these moves, the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, stressed their particular significance for the people of Ukraine severely affected by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster that resulted in massive radioactive contamination. He expressed the hope that that step would be followed by the other countries as well, thus creating the climate of trust and the necessary prerequisites for irreversible progress of humanity on the way of nuclear-arms reduction and their eventual elimination.

We would like to see the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the States that have renounced nuclear weapons safeguarded against the use or threat of use of force, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

What does security mean, after all? Permit me to quote from the 1985 United Nations study entitled "Concepts of security":

> "... security is a condition in which States consider that there is no danger of military attack, political pressure or economic coercion, so that they" - peoples - "are able to pursue freely their own development and progress." (A/40/533, para. 206)

That is exactly what we in Ukraine want most of all.

The world is following the events in the Commonwealth of Independent States with great attention and anxiety. There are good reasons for that. The political instability, economic crises, national conflicts and actual wars - all these mean trouble for the rest of the world. The nuclear problems are

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naturally, under the circumstances, among those to arouse particular uneasiness.

Ukraine is determined to become nuclear-weapon-free. We are not using these weapons as bargaining chips, but we certainly need clear international guarantees that our national security will not be jeopardized. Control over nuclear weapons and disarmament should be exercised in a just and balanced manner in order that the right of every State to its security is realized.

(Mr. Matseiko, Ukraine)

Of course it might be suggested that these are only our own problems. But are they really only ours and nobody else's? Are they not a part of the global problem of how ultimately to facilitate national, regional and international security without nuclear weapons? Would it not be worth while for the United Nations to address these problems in order to work out new and reliable cooperative security structures?

In resolution 46/32 the General Assembly noted with satisfaction that in the Conference on Disarmament there were no objections, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all had also been pointed out. The Assembly appealed to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to work actively towards an early agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character.

The Ukrainian delegation has studied with great interest and attention the report of the Conference on Disarmament (A/47/27), especially the part dealing with security assurances. We understand that the Conference had to concentrate its efforts on preparing the chemical weapons Convention. As a result, the Ad Hoc Committee met only three times. Informal consultations organized by the Chairman, Ambassador Sirous Nasseri of Iran, revealed that all delegations, including those of the nuclear-weapon States, continued to attach importance to the agenda item on security assurances and were ready to engage in substantive discussions on the issue.

We are glad to learn that the Ad Hoc Committee has reaffirmed that non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon

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States against the use of nuclear weapons pending effective measures on nuclear disarmament.

It goes without saying that pledges by nuclear-weapon States about non-first-use of nuclear weapons will substantially meet security concerns of nuclear-disarmed countries. We have noted with satisfaction that the Chinese delegation has renewed its declaration in this respect. Confirmation by Russia of the relevant unilateral obligations of the former Soviet Union as well as possible pledges by the other nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use the nuclear deterrent might clearly enhance the security of non-nuclear States.

Of course, we must take into consideration that there are specific difficulties related to different perceptions of the security interests of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. The Conference tried to reach agreement on a common formula and continued the quest for a common denominator for the substance of negative security assurances.

In our view, that work of the Conference should be considered in conjunction and interdependence with the positive security assurances specified by the Security Council in resolution 255 (1968), which recognized that aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat thereof, against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) would call for immediate action by the Council and by its permanent member nuclear-weapon States.

The Ukrainian delegation believes that the security of all non-nuclear States might be strengthened in at least two ways: first, the continued search for a common approach in the Conference on Disarmament on the substance of negative security assurances; and, secondly, strengthened positive security assurances within the Security Council.

(Mr. Matseiko, Ukraine)

As we understand it, these two directions are to be interdependent. The outcome of this very important work will influence the forthcoming non-proliferation Conference in 1995. Bearing in mind our first approach to negative security assurances, we must do everything possible to find a common formula covering all the non-nuclear-weapon States concerned. At the same time, it is desirable to supplement the formula, where possible, with additional provisions for specific categories of non-nuclear-weapon States. We are sure that Ukraine, as well as Belarus and Kazakhstan, represents a very specific category of States in this respect. We in Ukraine are ready actively to cooperate with the Ad Hoc Committee and in due course to present our ideas on this matter.

Having said that, we should like to touch upon the possible activity of the Security Council in connection with security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. The Chairman of the Committee was absolutely right when, in his opening statement to the Committee, he drew our attention to an important, and so far unused, sphere in the activities of the Council - that is, the sphere of disarmament. Article 26 of the Charter provides for "... the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments". Why can this not include certain effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons?

In this connection, we attach great importance to the valuable proposal made by the President of the United States in his statement in the General Assembly last month. According to that proposal, as we understand it, the Security Council should address new assurances to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the non-proliferation Treaty and come to its assistance, in accordance with the Charter, should it fall victim to an act of aggression involving nuclear weapons. This would certainly enhance positive security

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assurances, in the light of the fact that all five permanent members of the Security Council are now parties to the Treaty. We quite agree with the statement by the representative of New Zealand in the Committee that this development

"should greatly enhance prospects for progress in respect to both positive and negative security assurances." (A/C.1/47/PV.6, p. 38).

We think that it would be worth while to request the Security Council to study the possibility of the two following approaches: first, parallel declarations by all the permanent members of the Security Council that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States under any circumstances; and, secondly, pledges by all the permanent members of the Security Council to defend any non-nuclear-weapon country that is threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons.

The Ukrainian delegation has noted with satisfaction that the Russian Federation in its statement in the Committee reaffirmed the statement of the USSR representative in the Security Council on 17 June 1968 on the question of positive guarantees.

(Mr. Matseiko, Ukraine)

As has already been mentioned in this Committee, the problems of disarmament and international security are both interdependent and multidimensional. We must do everything possible to improve the Organization's ability to pursue and preserve peace. Let us remember the appeal made by the Secretary-General in his "Agenda for Peace":

> "The search for improved mechanisms and techniques will be of little significance unless this new spirit of commonality is propelled by the will to take the hard decisions demanded by this time of opportunity." (A/47/277, para. 6)

The CHAIRMAN: As members know, we are approaching Wednesday, 28 October, which is the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions under all disarmament agenda items. It would be appreciated if delegations would kindly submit their draft resolutions, especially those containing programme budget implications, to the Secretariat for processing as soon as possible. This will certainly facilitate the work of the Committee and will give enough time for members to conduct the necessary consultations on the draft resolution and make their comments, if they wish to do so, before the Committee proceeds to act upon them.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.